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Bowling Green State University
Choice behavior combines discrimination between distinctive outcomes, preference for specific outcomes and relative valuation of comparable outcomes. Previous work has focused on 1 component (i.e.,
preference) disregarding other influential processes that might provide a more complete understanding.
Animal models of choice have been explored primarily utilizing extensive training, limited freedom for
multiple decisions and sparse behavioral measures constrained to a single phase of motivated action. The
present study used a paradigm that combines different elements of previous methods with the goal to
distinguish among components of choice and explore how well components match predictions based on
risk-sensitive foraging strategies. In order to analyze discrimination and relative valuation, it was
necessary to have an option that shifted and an option that remained constant. Shifting outcomes among
weeks included a change in single-option outcome (0 to 1 to 2 pellets) or a change in mixed-option
outcome (0 or 5 to 0 or 3 to 0 or 1 pellets). Constant outcomes among weeks were also mixed-option (0
or 3 pellets) or single-option (1 pellet). Shifting single-option outcomes among weeks led to better
discrimination, more robust preference and significant incentive contrast effects for the alternative
outcome. Shifting multioptions altered choice components and led to dissociations among discrimination,
preference, and reduced contrast effects. During extinction, all components were impacted with the
greatest deficits during the shifting mixed-option outcome sessions. Results suggest choice behavior can
be optimized for 1 component but suboptimal for others depending upon the complexity of alterations in
outcome value between options.
Keywords: decision-making, incentive relativity, motivation, negative contrast, positive contrast

previous work neglects how different components of choice might
interact, diverge, or converge during motivated action and lacks an
ability to understand how different phases of motivation are influenced during the same choice. A major objective of the present
study was to examine different components of choice while animals experience a relatively more open environment, one that
simulates “foraging choice” (Zabludoff et al., 1988). The present
work focused on crucial, diverse components including discrimination, preference, and relative reward valuation. Discrimination
requires identifying a difference between alternatives. Discrimination is an essential part of work in sensation and perception but the
process is equally critical in the production of motivated action
including choice behavior (Michels, 1957; Peterson & Trapold,
1982; Watanabe et al., 2001). Discrimination becomes more demanding as stimulus or outcome properties converge (Lawrence,
1949; Shepard, 1987). Another key component is preference and
for many, it is synonymous with choice. Preference builds on
discrimination and inherently depends on value as a product of
outcome dimensions (Hull, 1934; Spence, 1952; Volkert, Lerman,
& Vorndran, 2005). Preference becomes more equal as reward
value converges (e.g., isohedonia can lead to equivalence in choice
over time; see Guttman, 1954). Finally, relative valuation is a
component of value updating based upon external and internal
factors (Clayton, 1964; Craft, Church, Rohrbach, & Bennett, 2011;
Morgado, Marques, Silva, Sousa, & Cerqueira, 2014). Incentive
contrast is one process that basically updates valuation of reward
to more positive when reward value upshifts and negative when
reward value downshifts (Flaherty, 1996). Animals are very pro-

There are a wide range of experimental designs used to investigate choice in animals and humans (da Matta, Gonçalves, &
Bizarro, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986; Real, 1991). A majority of paradigms focus
on preference and primarily examine either appetitive, instrumental behavior or consummatory measures separately (Kacelnik & El
Mouden, 2013). Appetitive behavior is defined as the behavior
involved in acquiring the outcome while consummatory behavior
involves intake or terminal action with the outcome. In general,
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ficient at reward discrimination, preference, and relative valuation
(Horridge, 2005; Rivalan, Valton, Seriès, Marchand, & DelluHagedorn, 2013; Tolman, 1938; Wikenheiser, Stephens, & Redish,
2013). Ideally, these components work together to produce optimal
choice that arises from evaluating short- and long-term memories
for reward value that are contextually dependent (Vestergaard &
Schultz, 2015). Studied separately, the components can be reduced
or absent. For example, incentive contrast is reduced due to alterations in physiological state (Panksepp & Trowill, 1971) or environmental shifts to outcome prediction or instrumental effort (Binkley et al., 2014; Webber et al., 2015). It is clear that animals can
learn alternatives and express effective choice behavior (McMillan, Sturdy, & Spetch, 2015; Montes et al., 2015; Robbins,
2002; Linwick & Overmier, 2006; Evenden & Robbins, 1984);
however, how these different components work together to produce choice is not well known especially in more unrestrained
environmental settings.
One goal of the present study was to examine how enhanced
ability to pace and to sequence responses during decision-making
in the rat influences different components of choice. Determining
the role of context in animal models of choice is important because
it could enable a more complete understanding for decisionmaking during self-paced, sequential choice (Kacelnik & Bateson,
1996). Most experimental designs limit the pacing and the sequential expression of choice behavior (Weber, Shafir & Blais, 2004).
Specifically, experimental research has focused on behavioral responses as a measure of preference such as pecks, lever presses, or
nose pokes (Baum, 1974; Bouton, Todd, Miles, León, & Epstein,
2013), one of two forced choices in a T maze (Logan, 1965;
Moustgaard & Hau, 2009), or licking/orofacial behavior (Flaherty
& Rowan, 1986; Frutos, Pistell, Ingram, & Berthoud, 2012). Other
paradigms examining decision-making utilize apparatuses such as
single operant boxes or runways restricting an animal’s ability to
pace activity and locomote (Marshall & Kirkpatrick, 2013; McClure, Podos, & Richardson, 2014). For example, an operant box
is a single chamber with different devices within it that the animal
can respond typically following extensive multiweek training and
involving the learning of associations between different stimuli
and the outcome delivery. The present paradigm combines aspects
of this previous work on choice (i.e., lever response ⫹ alleyway ⫹
conditioned place) to create an environment with different temporal contingencies that produce behavior that resembles more free
action to stay or leave and pattern responses in different ways.
Recent work by Blanchard and Hayden (2015) has shown when

comparing between a free-choice procedure and an intertemporal
choice procedure, rhesus macaques show more patience when
performing in the task with greater freedom. This performance in
a choice task with more self-pacing suggests that monkeys are
better at obtaining maximum reward than previous work using
intertemporal tasks shows (Kim, Hwang, & Lee, 2008). A similar
effect has been demonstrated in humans (Fisher, Thompson, Piazza, Crosland, & Gotjen, 1997). Moreover, nonhuman primates
have shown significant preferences for a free-choice task compared to a forced choice condition (Suzuki, 1999). Pigeons are able
to discriminate between human feeders dependent upon the physical characteristics and attitudes of the feeder (Belguermi et al.,
2011). Comparable with human behavioral results (Fisher et al.,
1997), free choice is also preferred to forced choice in avian
models (Catania & Sagvolden, 1980). It is problematic that results
could differ depending upon the nature of the choice environment
(i.e., forced vs. free) yet the bulk of work has been done using one
of the designs while the other has been significantly neglected in
experimental work.
A second goal of the present study was to ensure that the amount
and form of training reduced behavioral autonomy and enabled
valuation to potently influence different aspects of motivated action (Dickinson, 1985). Many designs require overtraining of
animals due to either difficult or convoluted behavioral procedures
(Funamizu, Ito, Doya, Kanzaki, & Takahashi, 2015) or complex
discrimination between outcomes (Morgado, Marques, Silva,
Sousa, & Cerqueira, 2014). This extensive training is necessary for
animals to adequately discriminate between options and then preference or reward updating is measured (de la Piedad, Field, &
Rachlin, 2006; Gibbon et al., 1988). The influence of reward value
on choice can be reduced or absent because animals have reduced
sensitivity to incentive value after extensive training (Adams,
1982). We have a relatively rapid training procedure most likely
enabling reward value embedded in the more or less riskier contexts to persistently influence choice. In addition, the use of
diverse, disparate levels of reward produced from multiple outcome dimensions reduces the production of behavioral autonomy
(Kosaki & Dickinson, 2010).
We have developed a new, three-box reward-seeking paradigm
(Figure 1) that integrates diverse features from previous methods
used to study reward choice and decision making (Powers &
Cromwell, 2012; Ricker et al., 2014). It creates a task that combines the advantageous aspects of commonly used choice paradigms. These include the exploration of an open field task, the

Figure 1. Representative schematic of the 3-box apparatus. The 3-box apparatus is depicted above. Rats are
placed in the middle “decision” box at the start of the experiment, and given the option to enter a cast acrylic
tube attached to either side of the box. Food receptacles (rectangles) are located directly opposite from the tunnel,
and water nozzles (circles) are located next to the door of each reward box. During outcome exposure of each
week, a guillotine door (dashed line) is lowered once IR sensors are broken just before entering one of the reward
boxes. Rats are able to roam this expanded environment for the entire 30-min session on test days.
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discrimination of a T maze, the environment of a conditioned place
preference task, and the option to include more standard operant
tasks (i.e., lever press). This paradigm overcomes the limitation of
reduced response selection by providing the opportunity to measure multiple dependent variables. These include measures of
reward approach (i.e., food cup checks, latencies to retrieve pellets,
and the number of times the animal chooses to enter each box) and
measures of outcome consumption (i.e., total reward received and
trials performed) as well as measures of place conditioning (i.e.,
the average amount of time spent in each box per entry and total
time spent in each box). By expanding the testing environment, we
provide a more expansive area for the animal to roam as opposed
to that utilized in a standard operant box. This straightforward
improvement provides an opportunity for a diverse set of behaviors to be examined. This paradigm also overcomes the limitation
of extensive training with a simplification of the action-outcome
relationship by making subsequent outcome deliveries contingent
on more naturalistic responses during food outcome retrieval.
Most importantly and different from previous work, the new
paradigm enables the analysis of diverse components of choice
(see Table 1). Discrimination can be investigated precisely by
monitoring how rats are able to identify choices that change in
outcome magnitude over time. Preference is monitored by measuring how rats choose between two alternatives within a single
testing session. Finally, relative reward valuation can be measured
by seeing how animals choose between reward outcomes that
remain constant between weeks, and that are compared with multiple alternative rewards (see Table 1). Previous experience with
alternative rewards can influence an animal’s choice. The subjective value that an animal assigns to a reward changes as the animal
engages with new rewards with changing objective values (Crespi,
1942). A difference in performance to identical outcomes after
exposure to a reward that differs in either magnitude or quality is
thought of as a relative reward effect (Webber et al., 2015). We
hypothesize that animals will change preference based on the shift
in reward magnitude in each box but only when the higher level of
magnitude offsets the increase in delay to outcome. Our preliminary data (Powers & Cromwell, 2012; Ricker et al., 2014) supported this rule, and it follows the general framework of risk-
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sensitive foraging. A point of indifference has been obtained using
a 50% higher reward outcome to offset the longer delay (Weeks 2
and 5). Other weeks with similar disparity are not equivalent
because the location with higher magnitude actually has the shorter
delay making it attractive on both dimensions. Preference is reversed within a 3-week testing period and discrimination and
contrast demonstrate “scaling” according to this proposed interaction. Scaling is observed as shifts in responding that are proportional to shifts in reward outcome value (e.g., magnitude). If the
interaction is upheld, it demonstrates the power of the risksensitive foraging model to predict not only preference but also
discrimination (e.g., absolute preference) and dynamic valuation
that arises from between session incentive relativity (e.g., positive
and negative contrast derived from comparisons to the baseline
weeks with equivalent responding).

Method
Subjects
Nine male Sprague–Dawley rats (Rattus norvegicus) weighing
291– 490 g were used in this study. The animals used in this study
come from a larger sample used from a study involving quiniolinic
acid lesions. The current animals are from the control group that
received sham surgeries using a 0.9 M phosphate buffered saline
solution. Animals were housed in 65 cm ⫻ 24 cm ⫻ 15 cm cages
with corncob bedding. Animals were food-deprived to no less than
85% of their free-feeding, baseline weight. They had ad libitum or
open access to food (Harlan Teklad Rat Chow #8604) from the end
of testing Friday until approximately 24 hr prior to the beginning
of testing on Monday. Water was available ad libitum in their
home cages as well as throughout testing. They were maintained
on a 12-hr reverse light/dark cycle (lights off at 8:00 a.m.). The
colony room was maintained at 70 °F and approximately 56%
humidity. All procedures were approved by the Bowling Green
State University Institutional Animals Care and Use Committee
(Protocol 12– 012). All efforts were made to keep animal suffering
to a minimum.

Table 1
Predictions for the Multiple Components of Choice Behavior
¡ Preference

Discrimination
Comparisons
Week
1
2
1
4
5
4

vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs

2
3
3
5
6
6

Box
Single-Outcome
Single-Outcome
Single-Outcome
Mixed-Outcome
Mixed-Outcome
Mixed-Outcome

Predictions
Magnitude outcomes
W1
W2
W1
W4
W5
W4

⬍
⬍
⬍
⬎
⬎
⬎

W2
W3
W3
W5
W6
W6

(0 ⬍ 1)
(1 ⬍ 2)
(0 ⬍ 2)
(0/5 ⬎ 0/3)
(0/3 ⬎ 0/1)
(0/5 ⬎ 0/1)

Comparisons
Week

Box

1
2
3
4
5
6

S vs. M
S vs. M
S vs. M
M vs. S
M vs. S
M vs. S

¡ Relative reward effect

Predictions
Alternating
outcomes
M⬎S
M⫽S
S⬎M
M⬎S
S⫽M
S⬎M

(0/3 ⬎ 0)
(0/3 ⫽ 1)
(2 ⬎ 0/3)
(0/5 ⬎ 1)
(1 ⫽ 0/3)
(1 ⬎ 0/1)

Predictions

Incentive
relativity

Box

Identical
outcomes

Direction of
contrast

M 1 ⬎ M2
M 3 ⬍ M2
S 4 ⬍ S5
S 6 ⬎ S5

0/3 ⬍ 0/3
0/3 ⬍ 0/3
1⬍1
1⬎1

Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive

Comparisons
Week
1
2
4
5

vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.

2
3
5
6

Note. The three main components involved in choice behavior include discrimination (left-side), preference (middle) and relative reward effects
(right-side). Predictions listed are based on what would be considered optimal choice. The relative reward effects are listed as incentive contrast effects
based on a baseline level of activity during the middle week of testing when the two outcomes are purportedly equal between the two boxes. (S ⫽
single-outcome box and M ⫽ mixed-outcome box). The numbers in the cells and located in parentheses represent the food pellet number dispensed during
the respective weeks.

4

RICKER, HATCH, POWERS, AND CROMWELL

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Experimental Apparatus
The three-box reward-seeking paradigm consists of three 25.40
cm ⫻ 30.48 cm ⫻ 40.64 cm cast acrylic boxes. A door is located
on the front of the middle “decision” box. On the right and left wall
of the box, there is a cast acrylic tunnel (9 cm diameter) that
connects to the other two boxes that are approximately 117 cm
apart. Each box is located in a separate closet and is connected to
the box next to it via tunnels that traveled through the walls of the
closets. Infrared (IR) beams are located at the entrance to each box
to record entry/exit times. A food cup is located directly across
from the tunnel in each of the “reward” boxes, and a pellet
dispenser is connected to each food cup to dispense reward (45 mg
dustless plain sucrose pellet; Bio-Serve, NJ). Infrared beams are
located at the bottom of the food cup to record any time the rat
checks for reward. A lever is located next to each food cup to
record any superstitious behaviors. Guillotine doors are located
just before the entrance to each reward box for training days and
are triggered by IR beam breaks. Water nozzles are located to the
left of the door of each reward box for ad libitum access throughout testing. Each reward box is placed within a sound-attenuating
chamber and a white noise generator is used to mask outside
noises. Both reward boxes are equipped with houselights that are
only on during training until the rat enters the box. Behavioral
measures are obtained using computer-controlled hardware with
custom written programs (Med Associates, Inc., Saint Albans,
VT).Video cameras are suspended above each reward box to
monitor each rat’s behavior.

Schedule of Outcome Shifts
The current experiment was set up to expose rats in one box to
reward magnitudes that changed over the course of two 3-week
sessions. During the first 3-week session, the pellet number in the
single-outcome box varied between weeks. In Week (W) 1, no
pellets were delivered in the single-outcome box. This pellet
number increased to one pellet in W2. It increased again in W3 to
two pellets. The reward number remained consistent throughout all
3 weeks in the mixed-outcome box. Each week, either no pellets or
three pellets (0/3) were dispensed. The behavioral control program
was arranged so that no more than two consecutive deliveries of
the same pellet magnitude could occur; therefore, half of the time
no pellets would be delivered, and half of the time three pellets
would be delivered. During the second 3-week session, the pellet
magnitude in the mixed-outcome box varied between weeks. In
W4, either zero or five pellets (0/5) were delivered. In W5, zero or
three pellets (0/3) were delivered. In W6, zero or one pellet (0/1)
was delivered. Each outcome had a 50% chance of being delivered. For the latter 3-week series, one pellet was delivered in the
single-outcome box over the entire 3-week session (W4 –W6).

Outcome Exposure
Rats were run through behavioral training or outcome exposure
on Monday and Tuesday of each week. This provided the animals
with an equal time experience in each reward box to be able to
express choice and demonstrate preference later in the week during
the open testing days. Rats were placed in the decision box directly
after the MED-PC program had been started. Once in the box, they

had the option to go into the left or right tunnel. Once the IR beam
to the reward box had been broken, the guillotine door lowered and a
10-min timer started. Five seconds after entry, the pellet reward would
be delivered to the food cup. Once 5 s had passed from an initial break
of a food cup IR beam (the animal retrieves the reward), pellets were
delivered. Pellets would then only be delivered again if five more
seconds had passed and the IR beam was broken again (fixed-interval
[FI] 5 schedule of reinforcement). After 10 min, the guillotine door
would lift, and the rat would be able to leave the box. When the IR
beam entering the decision box was broken, that guillotine door
would shut, forcing the rat to enter the other box while prohibiting it
from reentry into the already experienced box. Training would be
complete once this same process occurred in the other reward box.
This outcome exposure is labeled “forced choice” but differs from
other forced choice paradigms in that the animals are exposed to only
one alternative in sequence with the order based on their box preference.

Free Choice Tests
Rats were tested on free choice preference on Wednesday (Free
Choice 1) and Thursday (Free Choice 2) of each week. Two days
were used with the initial experience as an acclimation to open
testing and the second day used for data collection and comparison. During free choice testing, rats were placed in the middle,
decision box immediately after trial initiation. Rats were then free
to roam the apparatus for 30 min. Reward would be delivered to
each food cup 5 s after the initial IR beam break to the reward box.
Pellets were then delivered on an FI-5 s schedule when the food
cup IR beam was broken. At the end of the 30-min session, the
guillotine doors would lower to keep the rat in the final box.

Extinction
Extinction sessions were ran on Friday each week to examine
the power of the outcome to mediate behavior without primary
reward delivery. The same procedures were followed on extinction
days as on free choice testing with the exception that no pellets
were delivered during the extinction phase of testing.

Behavioral Measures
The three-box reward seeking paradigm allows for multiple
measures to be recorded to help fractionate the multiple components of choice behavior. We refer to these as measures of consumption (trials and total reward), measures of place conditioning
(total time in box and average time in box), and measures of
approach (foodcup checks, latencies, and entries). Trials refers to
the number of times each animal retrieved food on the FI-5
schedule. Total reward refers to the total number of pellets a rat
had eaten during the testing session. Data for trials is presented
throughout the text as the indicator for consummatory action
because of the significant positive correlations between the two
variables (significant values for r ranged from .874 –.995, p ⬍
.000). The amount of time the animal spent in each box was
recorded and is labeled as total time in box. This time was
averaged by dividing it by the number of entries made into that box
over the session to see how much time on average the rat would
spend in the box in a single visit. This measure was labeled

DISCRIMINATION, PREFERENCE, RELATIVE VALUATION

average time in box. Once again, due to high positive correlations
(significant values for r ranged from .632–.957, p ⬍ .020 –.000),
we limit reporting to total time in box. There were no significant
correlations among our measures of appetitive motivation. These
include foodcup checks (the number of times the IR beam in the
food receptacle was broken); latencies to obtain food outcome (the
duration of time [in milliseconds] between pellets being dispensed
and IR beam breaks in the foodcup); and entries into food cup (the
number of times the subject entered a specific box).
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Data Analysis
Predictions for the different components of choice are listed in
Table 1. All statistics were run using IBM SPSS statistics version
20. To assess reward discrimination, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the single-outcome box over
the first 3-week session and the mixed-outcome box over the
second 3-week session and pairwise tests between weekly sessions
(see Table 1).
We assessed preference in two ways. First, we used a preference
score to examine the percentage of optimal choice using only the
trial numbers completed in each box. This score was a measure for
the proportional choice for one alternative (the number of trials
performed in the box with the most advantageous outcome divided
by the total number of trials performed) and is used often in studies
of choice, risk and decision-making. We completed a comparison
among outcome exposure, open choice and extinction using 20min of each session. A Friedman ANOVA test was performed to
assess differences, and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test were then performed based upon obtaining significant main effects. Second, we
completed an analysis of variance with box (two levels) and week
(three levels) as the two variables (see Table 1). Pairwise comparisons were completed for each week providing a measure of

5

preference for one outcome versus the other during a single context of choice (e.g., serial outcome exposure/training or the more
open testing days).
To assess the relative reward effect, a one-way analysis of
variance was performed on the stable outcome among weeks
including the mixed-outcome box over the first 3-week session and
the single-outcome box over the second 3-week session (see Table
1). Significant main effects or interactions were analyzed using
pairwise comparisons. p values were adjusted within the 3-week
sessions using Bonferroni corrections. Significance was determined for discrimination and preference (both comparing between
3 weeks) if p ⬍ .017, for relative reward effects (two comparisons)
using p ⬍ .025.

Results
Outcome Exposure
Trials were measured during training sessions. Data presented
are from outcome exposure Day 2 (Figure 2). Taking data from
this day provides an adequate amount of time for the rats to learn
the outcomes associated with each box. A 3 (week) ⫻ 2 (box)
ANOVA performed over the first 3-week session revealed a main
effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 17.27, p ⬍ .01, as well as a box by week
interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 12.71, p ⬍ .01. Post hoc analyses revealed
that the rats performed significantly more trials in the mixedoutcome box in W1 (0/3 pellets ⬎0 pellets: t(8) ⫽ 2.46, p ⬍ .05,
95% CI [1.16, 35.50], d ⫽ .82) and switched preference in W3 (2
pellets ⬎0/3 pellets: t(8) ⫽ 2.33, p ⬍ .05, 95% CI [.14, 26.52], d ⫽
.78). A 2 ⫻ 3 ANOVA performed on the second 3-week session
revealed a main effect of box, F(1, 7) ⫽ 31.56, p ⬍ .01, and a main
effect of week, F(2, 14) ⫽ 25.27, p ⬍ .01. Post hoc analyses

Figure 2. Trials performed during outcome exposure training. The number of trials performed in each box over
both 3-week sessions. Each week (W) is listed on the x-axis with the single-outcome box (black bars) and
mixed-outcome box (white bars) represented above. Values are mean ⫾ standard error. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.
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showed that the rats performed significantly more trials in the
mixed-outcome box in W4 (0/5 pellet ⬎1 pellets: t(8) ⫽ 3.46, p ⬍
.01, 95% CI [10.21, 51.12], d ⫽ 1.15) and this pattern of preference shifted to the single-outcome box in W6 (1 pellet ⬎0/1 pellet:
t(7) ⫽ 4.92, p ⬍ .01, 95% CI [21.67, 61.83], d ⫽ 1.74).
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Reward Discrimination
Predictions were for a scaling in responding dependent upon
magnitude “single-outcome” boxes (2 ⬎ 1⬎0) during the firstthree week session and ‘mixed outcome boxes’ (0/5 ⬎ 0/3 ⬎ 0/1)
during the second 3-week session. Predictions were partially met
for the single outcome discrimination (W1 ⬍ W2 ⬍ W3) but not
observed for the second 3-week session. In this latter series,
responding during W4 (0/5) and W5 (0/3) was nonsignificantly
different leading to divergence from the predicted pattern (see
Table 1).
Measure of consumption. The hypothesized behavior was
observed in the first 3-week session with trials (see Table 2). There
was a main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 25.03, p ⬍ .01, with
significant differences between W1 and W2, as well as W1 and
W3 (1 pellet ⬎0 pellets: 95% CI [58.45, 131.99], d ⫽ 1.99; 2
pellets ⬎0 pellets: 95% CI [60.96, 119.26], d ⫽ 2.38). There was
a main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 15.32, p ⬍ .01, during the
second 3-week session, with significant differences between W4
and W6 (0/5 pellets ⬎0/1 pellets: 95% CI [18.17, 46.72], d ⫽
1.75).
Measures of approach. Analysis of food cup checks revealed
a main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 16.28, p ⬍ .01. There were
significant differences between W1 and W2, as well as W1 and
W3 (see Table 2; 1 pellet ⬍0 pellets: 95% CI [215.06, 389.17],
d ⫽ 2.67; 2 pellets ⬍0 pellets: 95% CI [284.10, 727.01], d ⫽
1.75). Finally, we found a main effect of week for latencies, F(2,
16) ⫽ 6.69, p ⬍ .01, with a significant difference between W1 and
W2, but not W1 andW3 or W2 and W3 (1 pellet ⬎0 pellets: t(8) ⫽
3.59, p ⬍ .01, 95% CI [123.56, 568.81], d ⫽ 1.20). We observed
a main effect of week for food cup checks during the second
3-week session, F(2, 16) ⫽ 7.52, p ⬍ .01. Pairwise t tests found
significant differences between W4 and W6, as well as W5 and
W6 (0/5 pellets ⬎0/1 pellet: 95% CI [187.74, 550.48], d ⫽ 1.56;
0/3 pellets ⬎0/1 pellet 95% CI [54.23, 674.22], d ⫽ .90).

Measure of place conditioning. There was a main effect of
week found for total time in box, F(2, 16) ⫽ 18.69, p ⬍ .01, with
significant differences between W1 and W2, as well as W1 and
W3 (see Table 2; one pellet ⬎0 pellets: 95% CI [272.45, 672.26],
d ⫽ 1.82; two pellets ⬎0 pellets: 95% CI [351.79, 867.66], d ⫽
1.82). There was also a main effect of week during the second
3-week session for total time in box, F(2, 16) ⫽ 8.29, p ⬍ .01, with
significant differences between W4 and W6, as well as W5 and
W6 (0/5 pellets ⬎0/1 pellet: 95% CI [327.76, 580.48], d ⫽ 2.76;
0/3 pellets ⬎0/1 pellet: 95% CI [51.10, 688.21], d ⫽ .89).

Preference
Preference Scores Across Choice Contexts
A preference score was obtained for each rat during outcome
exposure (i.e., forced choice), free choice, and extinction sessions
(Figure 3). This score reflects the percentage of trials an animal
performed that were considered advantageous out of all trials
performed for that session. A Friedman’s ANOVA revealed main
effects for all weeks (W1: 2(2) ⫽ 14.22, p ⬍ .01; W2: 2(2) ⫽
10.89, p ⬍ .01; W3: 2(2) ⫽ 14.00, p ⬍ .01; W4: 2(2) ⫽ 10.67,
p ⬍ .01; W5: 2(2) ⫽ 13.56, p ⬍ .01; W6: 2(2) ⫽ 16.22, p ⬍
.01). Further analyses revealed significant differences between the
outcome exposure day or forced choice sessions and extinction at
every week (W1: Z ⫽ ⫺2.31, p ⬍ .05; W2: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .01;
W3: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .01; W4: Z ⫽ ⫺2.31, p ⬍ .05; W5:
Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .01; W6: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .01), as well as
significant differences between free choice and extinction at every
week (W1: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .05; W2: Z ⫽ ⫺2.55, p ⬍ .01; W3:
Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .05; W4: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .05; W5: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67,
p ⬍ .05; W6: Z ⫽ ⫺2.67, p ⬍ .05). We also found significant
differences between forced choice and free choice sessions on W1
and W6 (W1: Z ⫽ ⫺2.13, p ⬍ .05; W6: Z ⫽ ⫺2.20, p ⬍ .05).

Preference During Free Choice Testing Day
Measure of consumption. Rats’ responses closely followed
our predictions (see Table 1 and 2). There was a main effect of
week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 11.26, p ⬍ .01, and a box by week interaction,

Table 2
Components of Choice in the Three-Box Apparatus
Trials
Week
1
2
3
4
5
6

Outcomes
0
1
2
1
1
1

vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs

0/3
0/3
0/3
0/5
0/3
0/1

Food cup checks

Single - Outcome

Mixed - Outcome

ⴱⴱ,⫹⫹

112.78 ⫾ 10.49
65.78 ⫾ 13.38
35.67 ⫾ 10.47#
56.22 ⫾ 8.24
60.78 ⫾ 14.95
23.78 ⫾ 5.22⫹⫹

6.78 ⫾ 1.08
102.00 ⫾ 16.38
96.89 ⫾ 12.66ⴱⴱ,⫹⫹
93.00 ⫾ 13.53
106.67 ⫾ 20.46
186.89 ⫾ 18.53ⴱⴱ,##

##

Single - Outcome
ⴱⴱ,⫹⫹

17.22 ⫾ 3.51
319.33 ⫾ 36.87
522.78 ⫾ 94.95ⴱ,⫹⫹
346.78 ⫾ 67.11
400.56 ⫾ 87.58
838.89 ⫾ 134.80ⴱⴱ,#

Total time in box(s)

Mixed - Outcome
917.11 ⫾ 130.62
497.11 ⫾ 129.47
223.00 ⫾ 62.79
470.89 ⫾ 82.35
466.00 ⫾ 138.34⫹
101.78 ⫾ 22.34⫹⫹

##

Single - Outcome
ⴱⴱ,⫹⫹

289.12 ⫾ 32.71
761.47 ⫾ 91.65
898.84 ⫾ 108.83⫹⫹
647.59 ⫾ 73.60
697.84 ⫾ 120.19
1106.75 ⫾ 84.17ⴱⴱ,#

Mixed - Outcome
1075.00 ⫾ 83.62##
697.08 ⫾ 99.26
522.09 ⫾ 89.22
760.56 ⫾ 82.74
676.09 ⫾ 119.20⫹
306.44 ⫾ 49.13⫹⫹

Note. Raw data for measures of consumption, approach, and place conditioning are represented. Data presented are for the number of trials each animal
performed (Trials), the number of times they checked each food cup (Food cup checks), and the total amount of time (in seconds) spent in each box (Total
time in box). Preference can be assessed by comparing the single-outcome to mixed-outcome in each week. Discrimination is assessed by comparing
single-outcome from W1–W3 and mixed-outcome from W4 –W6. Relative reward is assessed by comparing mixed-outcome from W1–W2 and W2–W3,
as well as single-outcome from W4 –W5 and W5–W6. Significant differences are indicated by ⴱ for preference, ⫹ for discrimination, and # for relative
reward. A single symbol represents p ⬍ .05, while double symbols represent p ⬍ .01 For example, ⴱ, ⫹, or # represent p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ ,⫹⫹, or ## reflect
p ⬍ .01. Values are mean ⫾ standard error.
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Figure 3. Comparative preferences across choice contexts. Percentage of optimal preference is compared
across free-choice (FreC), forced-choice (ForC), and extinction (Ext) conditions. Numbers along the x-axis
represent the number of pellets dispensed in the single-outcome box followed by the number of pellets dispensed
in the mixed-outcome box for each week of testing. ⴱⴱSignificant differences between FreC and ForC.
ⴱ
Significant differences between FreC and Ext, as well as ForC and Ext.

F(2, 16) ⫽ 28.69, p ⬍ .01. Significant differences between boxes
were found in W1 (95% CI [81.55, 130.45], d ⫽ 3.33) and W3
(95% CI [20.22, 102.23], d ⫽ 1.15). For the second 3-week
session, we found a main effect of box, F(1, 8) ⫽ 18.49, p ⬍ .01,
a main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 12.81, p ⬍ .01, and a box by
week interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 11.39, p ⬍ .01. A significant difference between boxes was found in W6 (95% CI [114.53, 211.69],
d ⫽ 2.58).
Measures of approach. Food cup checks also fit the profile
predicted during the first 3-week session, but this pattern did not
persist in the second 3-week session (see Tables 1 and 2). A main
effect of box, F(1, 8) ⫽ 14.18, p ⬍ .01, and a box by week
interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 18.68, p ⬍ .01, were observed for food cup
checks over the first 3-week session. Significant differences between boxes were observed in W1 (95% CI [595.95, 1203.83], d ⫽
2.28) and W3 (95% CI [51.53, 548.03], d ⫽ .93). There was a box
by week interaction for the second 3-week session, F(2, 16) ⫽
12.75, p ⬍ .01. Pairwise t tests found significant differences
between boxes in W6 (95% CI [431.70, 1042.53], d ⫽ 1.86).
There was a box by week interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 6.06, p ⬍ .05,
for latencies. Pairwise comparisons found significant differences
between boxes in W1, t(8) ⫽ 3.56, p ⬍ .01, 95% CI [124.54,
581.70], d ⫽ 1.19 and W2, t(8) ⫽ 2.31, p ⬍ .05, 95% CI [.49,
270.92], d ⫽ .77.
Measure of place conditioning. Our measure of place conditioning, total time in box, was significantly different between
boxes during multiple weeks, but did not precisely follow our
predictions (see Tables 1 and 2). For the first 3-week session, we
found a box by week interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 20.69, p ⬍ .01.
Significant differences were found between boxes in W1 (95% CI
[544.47, 1,027.30], d ⫽ 2.5) There was also a box by week
interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 9.03, p ⬍ .01, during the second 3-week

session, W6 was the only week with significant differences between boxes (95% CI [522.43, 1,078.19], d ⫽ 2.21).

Relative Reward Effect
Over the first 3-week session, the magnitude of reward in the
mixed-outcome box does not change objectively, but it should
decrease subjectively as the absolute magnitude in the singleoutcome box increases. Contrast effects were found for both positive contrast (W1⬎W2) and negative contrast (W3⬍W2) for
several measures. For the second series, only positive contrast was
obtained (W6⬎W5) for the one-pellet outcome and few negative
contrast indicators because of the parity for the outcomes in W4
and W5.
Measure of consumption. We found a main effect of week
for trials, F(2, 16) ⫽ 27.55, p ⬍ .01, with significant differences
between weeks (see Table 2; W1 ⬎ W2: 95% CI [25.31, 68.69],
d ⫽ 1.67; W2 ⬎ W3: 95% CI [2.52, 57.71], d ⫽ .84). There was
a main effect of week for trials over the second 3-week session,
F(2, 16) ⫽ 15.32, p ⬍ .01, with significant differences between
W5 and W6 (W6 ⬎ W5: t(8) ⫽ 7.22, p ⬍ .01, 95% CI [63.92,
123.86], d ⫽ 2.41) with no significant difference for the four and
five combination.
Measures of approach. A main effect of week was also found
for food cup checks, F(2, 16) ⫽ 15.72, p ⬍ .01, with significant
differences between W1 and W2 (W1 ⬎ W295% CI [160.46,
679.54], d ⫽ 1.24). During the second 3-week session, food cup
checks revealed a slightly different pattern of reward evaluation.
There was a main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 11.91, p ⬍ .01.
Significant differences were found between W4 and W5, as well as
W5 and W6 (W5 ⬎ W4: 95% CI [267.12, 717.09], d ⫽ .88; W6 ⬎
W5: 95% CI [110.84, 765.83], d ⫽ 1.03).
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Measure of place conditioning. There was also a main effect
of week for total time in box, F(2, 16) ⫽ 19.89, p ⬍ .01. Pairwise
t tests found a significant difference between W1 and W2 (W1 ⬎
W2: 95% CI [244.33, 511.52], d ⫽ 2.17). There was also a main
effect of week for total time in box for the second 3-week session,
F(2, 16) ⫽ 8.19, p ⬍ .01, with significant differences between W5
and W6 (W6 ⬎ W5: 95% CI [47.63, 770.19], d ⫽ .87).
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Extinction
Rats were exposed to an extinction period at the end of every
test week and received no food pellets for an entire 30-min session.
All data presented for extinction is for the dependent variable of
numbers of trials because other measures followed this similar
pattern of results.
Discrimination. For the first 3-week session, there was a
main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 24.61, p ⬍ .01. Significant
differences were found between all weeks (1 pellet ⬎ 0 pellets:
95% CI [10.02, 23.53], d ⫽ 1.91; 2 pellets ⬎ 0 pellets: 95% CI
[3.35, 11.98], d ⫽ 1.37; 1 pellet ⬎ 2 pellets: 95% CI [3.89, 14.33],
d ⫽ 1.34). For the second 3-week session, there was no main effect
found.
Preference. For the first 3-week session, there was a main
effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 5.90, p ⬍ .05, and a box by week
interaction, F(2, 16) ⫽ 36.55, p ⬍ .01. Significant differences
were found between boxes only in W1 (0/3 pellets ⬎ 0 pellets:
95% CI [17.71, 44.73], d ⫽ 1.77). For the second 3-week session,
there was a main effect of box, F(1, 8) ⫽ 6.57, p ⬍ .05. Significant
differences were only found between boxes in W6 (1 pellet ⬎ 0/1
pellets95% CI [3.34, 11.33], d ⫽ 1.41).
Relative reward effect. For the first 3-week session, there
was a main effect of week, F(2, 16) ⫽ 16.87, p ⬍ .01. Significant
differences were found between W1 and W2 (W1 ⬎ W2: 95% CI
[8.58, 29.64], d ⫽ 1.40). There were no main effects for the second
3-week session.

Discussion
In the current study, we used a paradigm that combines features
of other commonly used choice paradigms to examine choice
behavior in the rat and predicted that the animals would show
optimal responding for reward in a lawful, parametric fashion. The
basis for our predictions arises from the notion that animals will
optimize outcomes but take into account energy costs and risks
when performing different instrumental behaviors (Shapiro, Siller
& Kacelnik, 2008; Weber, Shafir & Blais, 2004). Our animals
weigh the costs of travel between two reward “patches” and have
one option that is riskier due to uncertain reward delivery with
longer delays for higher magnitude outcomes. It is a basis for
decisions used often in risk-sensitive foraging research (Kacelnik
& Bateson, 1996) but typically in rodent work, the decisions are
made in standard operant boxes and the subject is not in complete
charge of the pace or sequence of choices. Our behavioral results
indicated that choice varied depending upon the type of action and
the feature of decision-making under scrutiny. Lawful relationships were upheld primarily for consummatory actions but not for
appetitive behaviors. Most importantly, the findings show that this
context of more open choice had a powerful impact on key
components of motivation including discrimination, preference,

and relative valuation. The findings show clearly that measuring
discrimination, preference, and incentive contrast from the same
set of outcomes over a series of sessions leads to clear dissociations among these measures with disruption of certain component(s) while sparing others.
We predicted discrimination among different magnitudes of
outcome would show “scaling” from one week to another. Animals
can produce parametric responses that “scale” to magnitude or the
shifts in magnitude (Hutt, 1954). This has been shown using an
autoshaping (i.e., the ability of the animal to self-train via experience in the apparatus over several learning sessions) paradigm in
rats for both anticipatory (Papini & Pellegrini, 2006) and consummatory (Pellegrini & Papini, 2007) behavior. Magnitude is clearly
a potent reinforcer and has a powerful impact on learning with
better performance using higher magnitude outcomes (Rose,
Schmidt, Grabemann, & Güntürkün, 2009). Our prediction was
upheld for the first three weeks in that we did find scaled output for
the numbers of rewards consumed. The animals showed output of
consumption proportional to the magnitude of the reward (0 vs. 1
vs. 2 pellets). This scaling of consumption disappeared for the
second 3 weeks. A reason for this is the more complex outcome
computations required in the second 3-week set when outcome
value is derived from both magnitude plus a variable delay to
reinforcement. This result is very important in terms of demonstrating how animals lose the ability to perform critical “scaling”
when value determination becomes more complicated. These differences should not hinge on the degree of magnitude disparity
because this did not vary between the different set of 3-week
sessions. It is clear that having a 0 reward reference point made a
large impact on consummatory measures and reference points
certainly enable animals to build an associative network for outcome value more efficiently (Marshall & Kirkpatrick, 2015).
For both the first and second weeks of testing, approach behaviors lacked scaling between weeks. For example, food cup latencies and entries into the chambers had only one difference for the
first 3 weeks and no significant differences in the second set of 3
weeks. These anticipatory measures may reflect exploration during
the task and exploratory acts can be self-reinforcing and lead to
bursts of responding for the outcome intermixed with outcome
switching. Support for this idea comes from the high intensity food
cup checking (range: 571 to 936 checks during rewarded 30-min
session). This compulsive checking at the highest rate of once
every 2 s in one box or the other suggests that animals are
searching and moving rapidly between chambers. This result could
reflect a positive reinforcing aspect of the behavior per se in the
set-up with animals appearing to “win-shift” because shifting from
one outcome location to another per se holds incentive value.
Wheel-running has been found to be reinforcing (Belke & Heyman, 1994) and diverse animals express “contrafreeloading” by
choosing to expend more effort for outcomes when provided with
more or less effortful options (de Jonge, Tilly, Baars, & Spruijt,
2008; Jensen, 1963; Lindqvist & Jensen, 2009; McGowan, Robbins, Alldredge, & Newberry, 2010). This result is highly important because it demonstrates that having animals in a large environment self-directing choice behavior can lead to choice itself
being reinforcing.
Choice as preference is typically measured as the proportional
shift for one outcome over others and these preference scores
provide a way to determine risk, learning, and how value can be
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relatively weighted. We examined preference using the percentage
of optimal choice measure and examined these scores among our
different daily experiences including (a) serial outcome exposure
(forced choice or training day); (b) simultaneous outcome exposure with self-pacing (free choice or testing day); and (c) extinction. We found that the context has a substantial impact on how the
animal chooses over an extended session. The self-paced environment had the highest level of optimal choice in all weeks when
preference was predicted to significantly vary between options.
This was most significant when one option was the lowest magnitude or 0. When animals had back-to-back experiences with two
options, they made significantly less optimal choices despite clear
discriminable alternatives. For example, between zero option and
the 0/3 mixed-option animals chose the outcome with food only
58% of the choices whereas the open test day this optimal choice
rose to nearly 90% of the responses. Extinction in a more open
arena obliterated choice for the optimal outcome leading to higher
activity in the nonpreferred outcome in most cases. This could
arise because of a “frustration” effect when responding to the
higher value outcome and a shift in responding directed to the
previously lower value alternative.
Preference as the choice for one alternative over another during
a single, daily session was mainly framed by the difference in
delays for reward outcome between options. Magnitude was comparatively less influential. Animals were averse to waiting on
average an additional 2.5 s in order to obtain a 1.5 pellet advantage. This is in contrast to previous work that showed rats will wait
for up to 25 s in order to obtain three pellets when a one pellet/5
s outcome is the alternative (Logan, 1965). Logan (1965) used a
forced choice paradigm with two alleyways for the animals to
choose from in order to obtain each outcome. Our subjects had a
strong aversion to the delay in the open or free foraging test
sessions. Overall, it was consistent as animals reliably chose the
box with the 5-s delay even when the magnitude was higher in the
opposite box. The only time the animals chose the outcome with
the 7.5-s delay on average was when it was pitted against the
no-reward outcome. High levels of delay discounting (i.e., the
reduction in value for an outcome that is relatively delayed over
time) have been presented in basic and clinical science work (da
Matta et al., 2012; Heyman, 2003). Animals or humans with high
levels of delay discounting have been shown to have poor behavioral and emotional control (Calvert, Green, & Myerson, 2010;
Green & Myerson, 2004; Kollins, 2003; Odum, 2011; Tanno,
Maguire, Henson, & France, 2014) and human work has connected
higher discounting to diverse psychological disorders (Madden,
Francisco, Brewer, & Stein, 2011). The results of the present work
provide a unique perspective on the aversion to the delay because
it may be arising from the preference for exploration as greater
than the aversion to waiting. Adaptive foraging must take into
account “pursuit times” in order to decide whether or not delays
are too costly (Kagel, Green, & Caraco, 1986). In some cases,
higher levels of gratification can be obtained following a longer
delay possibly making the outcome value higher (Reynolds, de
Wit, & Richards, 2002). Overall, the findings suggest that delays
can have different incentive values or be influenced by different
properties of the environment. Future work must explore preference and other aspects of choice across choice contexts including
serial and simultaneous choice as well as “forced” choice when
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options are limited during responding but available as a grouped
set of alternatives over shorter and longer periods of time.
Relative valuation comparisons were examined using baseline
activity during the second and fifth weeks of testing. This strategy
resembles intraschedule contrast that utilizes a period of outcome
equivalence as a baseline period from which to explore contrast
(McSweeney & Norman, 1979). Positive contrast would be the
outcome upshift in W1 or W6 and negative contrast would be the
outcome downshift in W3 and W5. Comparing W5 and W6,
positive contrast was expressed for all measures except latencies to
retrieve food pellet and entries into the box. Negative contrast was
found in only a few consummatory measures during the initial 3
weeks. Positive contrast was found even during extinction but only
for the comparison of the 0/3 outcomes between W1 and W2. This
positive contrast effect occurs due to the low level of outcome in
the comparable box in W1. Typically, negative contrast is more
robust compared to positive contrast (Flaherty, 1996; Mellgren,
1972). This is true especially for consummatory measures of
licking rate monitored during rapid presentation or simultaneous
experiences (Flaherty & Rowan, 1986). Negative contrast is more
pervasive and instrumental successive negative contrast has been a
reliable finding using the runway and other appetitive measures
(Binkley et al., 2014). Positive contrast is typically obscured by
ceiling effects or the obstruction of inducing behavioral effects
because of limits in increasing behavior (Campbell, Crumbaugh,
Knouse, & Snodgrass, 1970). Animals respond at a high level to
greater levels of incentive and are not able to increase responding.
This confound was reduced in the present study of “foraging
choice” using a larger environmental setting and examining responses between distinct locations.
The idea that animals can form a relative incentive comparison
between weeks is not novel, and previous work has shown that
animals retain and express a contrast effect over a 2-week interval
between the training and testing sessions (Gordon, Flaherty, &
Riley, 1973). One way that the present contrast analysis is different
from traditional contrast analyses is that an outcome comparison
week with two different outcomes was used as the baseline. In
order to explore how this difference in baseline could impact
contrast, future work could incorporate a testing session in which
the animals are exposed to identical outcomes in each location.
Previous work using instrumental responses to study relative reward did find that different instrumental actions were differentially
sensitive to contrast (Webber et al., 2015). Also, incentive contrast
was only one of several relative reward effects observed to impact
instrumental action (Webber et al., 2015). The present experimental paradigm could be used easily to investigate other relative
effects including positive induction (Weatherly, Nurnberger, &
Hanson, 2005) or variety effects (Bouton, Todd, Miles, León, &
Epstein, 2013) and note their relationship to other components of
motivation. These relative reward effects are powerful and positive
induction can be defined as the increase in response to an outcome
of lower value proportional to the value of an alternative. It
basically means that one outcome of lower value induces stronger
responses during anticipation for an outcome of higher value.
Variety on the other hand is dependent upon the overall context,
and is defined as the impact of responding that depends upon the
diversity of the set of alternatives available. A baseline rate of
responding should be obtained with zero variety which in real-life
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might be impossible but is often used in experimental work (Bouton et al., 2013).
Discrimination, preference, and contrast analyses coalesced as
strong measures for choice behavior during the test and extinction
sessions; however, these components also dissociated from one
another. Making predictions that follow strict parametric relationships that incorporate variability of reward pitted against constant
reward may not fit the data when animals have the ability to
“change one’s mind” at multiple time points. This means that
theoretical frameworks such as risk-sensitive foraging must take
into account the simultaneous availability of one or even more
options (Schuck-Paim & Kacelnik, 2007). Future research using
rewards such as drugs of abuse or manipulating brain regions
involved in reward processing can utilize these findings in order to
make stronger predictions and extend existing theories.
An example in which reward preference has been divided includes the work on the divisible components of “liking” and
“wanting” (for review, see Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013) In the
present work, the dependent measure of total reward could be an
indicator of overall preference for that reward or how much the
animal may “like” the reward. Food cup checks resemble the
compulsive nature that has developed from experiencing the reward or how much the animal “wants” the reward. Investigating
components involved in “liking” or “wanting” of rewards within a
context of free choice could help fill the gaps of knowledge still
left in disorders such as addiction (Berridge, Robinson & Aldridge,
2009; Koob, 2015; Rachlin, 2007). Multiple studies have recently
observed contrast effects while failing to find discrimination between outcomes (Binkley, Webber, Powers, & Cromwell, 2014;
Webber, Chambers, Kostek, Mankin, & Cromwell, 2015). Typically, this is measured in different sessions but can be found with
the same behaviors in the same sessions (Papini & Pellegrini,
2006). Wanting without liking and vice versa occurs following
specific brain manipulations or drug exposure (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). The underlying neural regions involved in magnitude
discrimination (Cromwell & Schultz, 2003) and relative reward
processing (Cromwell, Hassani, & Schultz, 2005; Funamizu, Ito,
Doya, Kanzaki, & Takahashi, 2015) overlap but could rely on
different neural ensembles to encode motivational properties (Ito
& Doya, 2015). Determining the physiological basis for distinct
components of choice may reveal special vulnerabilities or computational abilities not otherwise uncovered (Berridge, 2012; Berridge & Cromwell, 1990).

Conclusion
Our findings show that animals on a negative energy budget
respond in a risk-averse fashion yet express seeking or exploration
as a choice irrespective of the differential values of options. This
alters “optimal” preference and rescales discrimination and relative valuation. The strict parametric relationships for appetitive
and consummatory actions mostly fell short because of the variability of choice when animals have the ability to “change one’s
mind” at multiple time points. This means that theoretical frameworks such as risk-sensitive foraging must take into account simultaneous availability of multiple options as well other psychological processes involved in choice besides preference (Abarca &
Fantino, 1982; MacDonall, 2009; Schuck-Paim & Kacelmik,
2007; Aw, Vasconcelos, & Kacelnik, 2011). It should be noted that

our experiment used food-restricted animals. This could be a major
limitation of the current study due to the lack of generalizability to
the normal status of humans and other animals. Future work would
want to address this issue and explore components of choice as
they interact with or are influenced by internal physiological state
changes. (Bindra, 1974)
The results suggest the importance of dissociations among
phases of motivation and components of choice. They suggest that
acquiring reward at one point in time as a preference does not
necessarily reflect either previous discrimination or contrast or
anticipated outcome valuation computed from short or long-term
experience. Foraging choice could be optimized if these components converge to evaluate risk most effectively. This form of
interactive choice with “scaled” responding of all components
across weeks was observed only for consummatory measures and
when animals worked for more “simple” constant and certain
outcomes. Future work will have to explore the necessity of
components of choice for optimal foraging and decision-making.
The present work provides a method and a framework that can be
used for future exploring and for developing ways to meet the
challenge of understanding what factors are involved in optimizing
and controlling choice and decision-making in comparative, experimental research.
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